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Abstract—In smart factories and smart homes, devices such as
smart sensors are connected to the Internet. Independent of the
context in which such a smart sensor is deployed, the possibility to
change its configuration parameters in a secure way is essential.
Existing solutions do provide only minimal security or do not
allow to transfer arbitrary configuration data. In this paper,
we present an NFC- and QR-code based configuration interface
for smart sensors which improves the security and practicability
of the configuration altering process while introducing as little
overhead as possible. We present a protocol for configuration
as well as a hardware extension including a dedicated security
controller (SC) for smart sensors. For customers, no additional
hardware other than a commercially available smartphone will be
necessary which makes the proposed approach highly applicable
for smart factory and smart home contexts alike.
Index Terms—Near Field Communication; Internet of Things;
smart sensor; configuration; security controller.
I. INTRODUCTION
For smart sensors [1] that are connected to the Internet it is
crucial that their configuration and firmware can be updated
in a secured and efficient way. Such smart sensors can be
deployed in a wide range of fields such as in a smart factory
or in a smart home.
Smart Factory [2]: In smart factories it is essential to
perform maintenance operations of sensors involved in the
production prcoess. By introducing a secured and easy to
use configuration interface, even untrained staff can perform
firmware updates or configuration changes. However, it is very
important to protect the confidentiality and authenticity of
configuration data as employees applying the configuration
updates could be potential adversaries. By enabling any em-
ployee or external person to perform configuration operations,
the flexibility of the already deployed sensors will be increased
while the associated maintenance costs will be decreased [3].
Smart Home [4]: Also in a smart home context, configura-
tion and firmware updates for devices need to be performed
using a secured and easy to use configuration interface. De-
vices not only include smart sensors but also other electronic
devices such as WiFi routers. Similar to the smart factory use-
case, also in a smart home context the configuration data must
be secured against various attacks for sustaining the proper
functionality of the configured devices. A configuration inter-
face included into smart home devices enables any customer
to perform firmware and configuration updates. These updates
could, for instance, even be provided by a vendor’s helpdesk.
By including such configuration interfaces into smart sen-
sors, also the Bring Your Own Key (BYOK) principle [5]
can easily be applied in both the smart factory and smart
home context. BYOK would allow customers to change vendor
supplied cryptographic keys, and thus, give them the certainty
that no third party is able to access their data.
The approach presented in this paper not only is able to
transfer cryptography keys but also arbitrary configuration
data and firmware updates. To transfer data, NFC technology
is chosen for three reasons. (i) NFC offers some security
advantages compared to other wireless technologies [6]. Also,
certain kinds of attacks such as man-in-the-middle are harder
to conduct due to the limited communication range of NFC.
(ii) The update process can be performed without an internal
power source, if the necessary hardware is powered by the
NFC field. (iii) NFC is easy and intuitive to use. Humans
easily understand the principle of bringing one device near to
another to transfer data [7].
If NFC is used to transfer data from a backend to a mobile
device and from the mobile device to smart sensors, at least
three NFC-enabled devices would be necessary. While smart
sensor and mobile device must be equipped with an NFC
interface in any case, needing an additional NFC-enabled
device such as an NFC reader for the backend is inconvenient
at least in a smart home context. Therefore, a combination of
NFC and QR-Codes is used in the approach presented in this
paper. The presented approach also relies on the functionalities
provided by a security controller (SC). We propose to use a SC
to protect the confidentiality and authenticity of configuration
data that is stored on the SC. To the best knowledge of the
authors, no other publication described a combination of these
techniques to perform updates for smart sensors. The main
contributions of this paper are:
1) The presented configuration approach allows arbitrary
configuration data including firmware updates to be
transferred in a secured manner.
2) The presented approach therefore is suitable for indus-
trial as well as smart home use-case scenarios.
3) A hardware extension and cryptographic methods are
presented that are applicable also for legacy sensors.
The remainder of this paper will be structured as follows. In
Section II, background information on the used technologies
as well as related work will be given. Section III presents the
proposed NFC- and QR-Code based configuration interface
for smart sensors. This interface will be evaluated with
respect to security and the imposed overhead in Section IV.
This paper will then be concluded with Section V where
possible future work is stated as well.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Near Field Communication (NFC)
NFC is a contactless communication technology that is
based on RFID standards. It operates at a radio frequency
of 13.56 MHz, up to a range of approximately 10 cm with
supported bit rates of 106, 212, 424 and 848 kbits per second
(kbps). Also, NFC devices are compatible with many existing
RFID devices and tags as the NFC standard comprises various
RFID standards [8]. NFC is used in a diverse range of
businesses. Today, the most well-known application of NFC
is in the mobile payment sector [9]. Coskun et al. [10] note
that NFC is also widely used in mobile ticketing applications.
Another prominent field for NFC is the Internet of Things
(IoT). Atzori et al. [11] state that NFC [...] together with RFID
[...] will link the real world with the digital world.
B. Quick Response (QR) Code
A QR code is a two-dimensional code that offers various
advantages over traditional (linear) barcodes such as a much
higher data density or the possibility to read QR codes from all
directions. The higher density allows a maximum capacity of
2953 bytes. Although the encryption of a QR code’s content
is possible, encrypted QR codes can be rarely found [12].
Therefore, Conde-Lagoa et al. [13] suggest to encrypt the
content using symmetric cryptography. Soon [14] lists sample
applications such as ticketing or identification of all sorts of
items.
C. Security Controller (SC)
SCs are used to provide protected processing and storage of
data. The key differentiator when compared to traditional pro-
cessing units is the tamper resistance [15] of such SCs which
even includes invasive attacks utilizing physical access to the
hardware. However, as SCs are not as powerful as general-
purpose controllers, splitting the execution environment into
a secured world and into a normal world is suggested for
instance by Vasudevan et al. [16]. This splitting principle, also
called security by isolation or dual-execution [17], is realized
by implementing SCs as external hardware modules.
D. Configuration via NFC
Configuring devices via an NFC interface is quite a novel
topic. Wu et al. [18] discuss the possibility to reprogram
computational RFIDs (CRFIDs) over the air. In their approach,
TABLE I
COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORK
Related
Work
Necessary
Hardware
Supported
Payload
Security
Considerations
[18] RFID Card Reader,CRFIDs
Firmware
Only None
[19] NFC-enabledPhone, and Sensor
Arbitrary
Data
Encryption used except
for initial update; No en-
cryption on mobile device
[20] At least 2 AndroidDevices for P2P
Arbitrary
Data None
[21],
[22]
RFID tags, 2 NFC
devices to pair
Pairing in-
formation None
This
Work
NFC-enabled
phone and sensor
Arbitrary
Data Discussed in Section III
the firmware of passive CRFID tags is reprogrammed using
the Electronic Product Code (EPC) protocol. Haase et al. [19]
present an NFC based configuration solution for sensors and
actuators in the home automation context. The authors propose
to extend existing hardware with an NFC module that can
then be used as a configuration interface for standard smart
phones. The authors present a hardware concept and prototype
as well as a mobile application for Android smart phones.
Serfass and Yoshigoe [20] present a framework for NFC
communication in wireless sensor networks. This Android
based framework, according to the authors, would allow P2P
transport of arbitrary data. In contrast, a more widely used
approach is to use NFC to speed up the pairing of wireless
devices [21], [22]. A comparison of related work to the
approach presented in this paper is given in Table I. As can
be seen there, all but one approach do not consider security
at all. The approach presented by Haase et al. [19] mentions
encryption but only encrypts the data while it is transferred
via NFC. The data, however, can be read and changed on
the Android smartphone. Also, no solution to transfer the
configuration data to the smartphone is given in that work.
III. SECURECONFIG
Configuring smart sensors in a smart factory as well as in a
smart home context is desirable. For a solution that is suitable
for both contexts, a couple of requirements need to be fulfilled.
To be usable in a smart factory context, a central instance that
manages all active configurations is needed. In a smart home
context, no additional hardware besides a mobile device and
sensors should be necessary to make the proposed approach
feasible for many users. Therefore, the system architecture
shown in Fig. 1 is proposed. It comprises three components.
1) Backend: Configurations are created, updated and se-
curely stored at the backend.
2) Mobile Device: The mobile device is used to transfer
configuration data provided by the backend to the smart
sensor. In our prototype we used a smartphone.
3) Smart Sensor: The smart sensor receives the provided
configuration update.
Payload
Smart
Sensor
WiFi, 3G, 4G
NFC
Payload
Payload
PropA = value1
PropB = value2
PropC = value3
Fig. 1. Hybrid communication approach: On the left hand side, a configuration
package is fetched from the backend using a QR code. On the right hand side,
the configuration of a smart sensor using NFC is shown.
In the context of this paper, it is assumed that the data stored
on the backend is secured by appropriate security mechanisms
such as a hardware security module (HSM), and thus, data
stored at the backend is efficiently protected from loss or
manipulation.
A. NFC Enhancement
To equip any arbitrary sensor with NFC capability and a SC,
we propose a hardware component named NFC Enhancement.
The component is shown in Fig. 2. As can be seen there, it
comprises two controllers and various interfaces. The reasons
for suggesting a dedicated NFC enhancement module are:
1) By designing a dedicated hardware module with an
explicit interface to sensors, currently available (legacy)
sensors can easily be transformed into a smart sensor.
The NFC enhancement module can easily be offered
as a single PCB which is easy to integrate for sensor
vendors.
2) By including two controllers, responsibilities can be split
perfectly according to the properties of both controllers.
The sensor host controller provides interfaces to the
sensor and optionally to a network while also offering
computational power and memory for any kind of ap-
plication. The less powerful but energy efficient SC on
the other hand offers a secured execution environment
and protected storage for configuration data as well as
an NFC interface.
3) The NFC interface connected to the SC allows for ad-
hoc connectivity instead of opening the configuration
interface to a potential network connection. Also, the SC
can be powered through the NFC field which allows for
configuration updates independent of the sensor’s and
host controller’s power supply.
B. Hybrid Communication Approach
As shown in Fig. 1, different technologies for data transfer
are proposed in our approach. To transfer configuration data
NFC Enhancement
Sensor
Host Controller
Security
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Sensor
Interface
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Interface
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Interface
Fig. 2. NFC Enhancement component which can be connected to any
conventional sensor via the Sensor Interface and thus making it a smart sensor.
from the backend to the mobile device, QR codes are used. The
configurations stored on the mobile device are then transferred
to the smart sensor using NFC. The reasons for using this
hybrid approach are:
1) By using QR codes to transfer configurations to the
mobile device, no additional hardware (aside from the
mobile device) such as an NFC reader is needed by
customers. Configurations are imported by simply scan-
ning the QR codes. This makes our approach especially
suitable for smart home contexts while not limiting its
usefulness in industrial contexts. Configurations could
be printed for maintenance workers or displayed in web
based configuration interfaces for customers.
2) NFC is suggested to transfer configuration data from
the mobile device to the smart sensor. Reasons for using
NFC for this data transmission are the additional security
resulting from the limited communication range as well
as the possibility to also configure sensors that are
disconnected from their power supply. This also allows
the initial configuration of sensors by the vendor during
their assembly where no power supply is available. This
property adds additional usefulness to our approach.
As a result of using two different technologies for data
transfer, two separate data structures and methodologies need
to be applied which are discussed for both variants.
C. Quick Response Code
Due to the size limitations of a QR code’s maximum
payload, two different modes for transferring configuration
data to the mobile device are suggested.
1) The whole configuration payload is stored in the QR
code, which allows to store about 2900 bytes of data. We
denote this type as inline QR code. Inline QR codes do
not require the mobile device to have an active network
connection, thus, those codes can be distributed, for
instance, to a maintenance worker without restrictions.
2) If the configuration data is larger than the size limit of
2900 bytes, only an URL pointing to the backend is
included in the QR code. The mobile device then needs
to fetch the configuration data from the backend using
a secure channel (TLS). This type is denoted as URL
QR code. For the download process, the mobile device
needs to have a network connection through which the
backend can be reached.
The type that is used to transport configuration data how-
ever, does not solely depend on the configuration data’s size.
A second factor is the desired security level, as no active con-
nection to the backend is needed for the inline type. Therefore,
some of the security measures mentioned in Section III-E can
not be applied.
D. Near Field Communication
To transfer configuration data via NFC, the NFC Data
Exchange Format (NDEF) [23] that uses the NFC Forum
reader/writer mode is used. NDEF abstracts the contactless
communication and is supported by mobile platforms such as
Android [24]. The proposed structure for NDEF packages is
shown in Fig. 3. As can be seen there, various security related
fields are included in addition to the (encrypted) configuration
data.
E. Security Measures
To provide confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of the
transferred configuration data, authenticated encryption (AE)
[25] is used. As can be seen in the NDEF packet structure
shown in Fig. 3, the transferred packet comprises a couple of
security related fields as well as the encrypted payload, and a
MAC; the later two are calculated by applying AE. The AE
method of operation considered as having the best security
properties is encrypt-then-MAC [26] which is the reason why
this approach is used in our work. When using AE it is
also important to not use the same key for both encryption
and hashing; therefore, a cryptographic key derivation [27] is
applied to generate separate encryption and hashing keys from
a master key.
In addition to the aforementioned cryptographic principles,
additional information regarding the configuration data is
included in the NDEF message (see Fig. 3). This information is
used by the SC at the smart sensor to decide if a configuration
update is rejected or accepted and consequently applied. As the
confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of this information
also needs to be protected, all but two fields are included in
the encryption process. The two unencrypted fields are:
• Realtime: The time in milliseconds since the mobile
device was started.
• Cipher Spec: Specifies the applied cryptographic algo-
rithms for the authenticated encryption.
The fields which are included in the encrypted payload are:
• Version: The configurations version number. A smart
sensor will reject configuration updates with a config-
uration number less or equal to the currently applied
configuration.
• Validity: If the transmitted realtime is later than the
specified validity, a configuration update will be rejected.
Encrypted
Payload
MAC
Cipher Spec
2 Byte
Realtime
4 Byte
Plaintext
Sensor ID
4 Byte
Validity
4 Byte
Version
2 Byte
Fig. 3. NDEF packet structure. Realtime and Cipher Specs are transferred
unencrypted. The size of the attached MAC depends on the cipher specs.
• Sensor ID: If the specified sensor ID does not match, the
configuration update is rejected.
As there is no time synchronization between the backend
and the smart sensor, the process of verifying the configu-
ration’s validity needs to be discussed in detail. Whenever a
configuration is fetched from the backend, the following steps
are performed:
1) For each configuration, a validity period ∆ needs to be
specified at the backend.
2) The mobile device sends a request to the backend,
containing the current realtime ϑ.
3) Upon encrypting the configuration data, the included
validity ν = ϑ+ ∆ is calculated.
4) The encrypted configuration data is sent to the mobile
device.
For our approach to function properly, we assume a secured
time source in the mobile device. In the case of an inline QR
code, no connection to the backend is established; therefore,
no validity can be specified for the included configuration data.
Due to this, the inline mode needs to be considered as less
secure than the URL mode.
IV. EVALUATION
A prototype was realized to evaluate the feasibility, usabil-
ity, and functionality of the presented approach. This proto-
type, pictured in Fig. 4, contains the following components:
1) Sensor: An air pressure sensor is used in this prototype
to demonstrate the configuration update process.
2) NFC Enhancement: The NFC enhancement prototype
that was realized is based on a concept presented by
Lesjak et al. [3] that uses an Infineon XMC4500 mi-
crocontroller (Cortex M4 family) as the general purpose
controller. This controller offers connection interfaces
such as USB and Ethernet, as well as I2C. Via this
I2C interface, a common criteria [28] EAL5+ certified
SC by Infineon is connected to the XMC4500. This SC
provides security features such as secured data storage
and code execution by using a self-checking dual CPU
concept, integrity checks for data transfers and caches,
and encrypted memory and calculations in the CPU. Fur-
thermore, this SC also includes a contactless interface
capable of NFC communication. The NFC antenna is
integrated into the NFC enhancement module as well.
Sensor Host Controller
XMC4500
Security Controller
SLE78
NFC Interface to 
Mobile Device
Sensor Interface
Fig. 4. NFC enhancement prototype.
3) Mobile Device: A Nexus S smartphone was used as
NFC-enabled device in the presented prototype. On this
device, Android 4.1.2 Jelly Bean was installed to use the
latest NDEF functionality included with API level 14.
4) Backend: The backend was realized on a standard Win-
dows PC in this prototype.
This prototype then was used to measure the time necessary
for an update process. A configuration update containing 64
byte of data, for example, took roughly 200ms on average
which is similar to the time a TLS handshake would need on
such hardware.
A. Threat Analysis
To demonstrate the achieved security level, a threat analysis
which highlights Entities (E), Assets (A), Threats (T),
applied Countermeasures (C), and Residual Risks (R) is
conducted. Due to the higher security offered by the URL
QR code, this mode is discussed in this threat analysis. An
overview of the threat analysis in goal structure notation
(GSN) is shown in Fig. 5. The attack possibilities that are
analysed are the smart sensor interface as well as the mobile
device which is seen as a data channel. The backend is
assumed to be properly secured by measures such as an
appropriate firewall and a HSM, the SC at the smart sensor is
assumed to be certified to the security level EAL5+ according
to the common criteria. The assets that need to be protected
are configuration data (A1) and sensor functionality (A2).
Threats can be posted by the NFC enhancement vendor (E1),
customer (E2), mobile device user (E3) and an external
adversary (E4).
Threats resulting from intentional or unintentional back-
doors (T1), weak cryptographic algorithms (T2) and bugs
Fig. 5. Overview of threat analysis in GSN.
in cryptographic algorithms (T3) by the vendor (E1) are
investigated in the common criteria EAL5+ certification
process (C1) for the included SC. The initial encryption keys
specified for each SC could be lost in a security breach (T4)
or even disclosed in any form (T5) by the vendor (E1). This
can be mitigated by changing the initial key (C2) as part of
a configuration by the customer (E2). Any malicious mobile
device user (E3) could try to manipulate configuration
data (T6), try to apply outdated configurations (T7) or
try to apply configurations to wrong sensors (T8). The
presented security measures (C3), however, provide efficient
mitigation of these threats. If the person responsible to update
configurations (E3) does not apply the configuration at all
(T9), a potential denial of service attack results if the sensor’s
functionality is influenced by the missing configuration. There
currently is no security measure implemented to counteract
missing updates (R1). If the malicious mobile device user
(E3) or an adversary (E4) with physical access to the
sensor continuously tries to change a configuration which
is rejected by the SC, a possible DoS attack (T10) could
result. There is currently no security measure implemented
against this kind of attack (R2). Attacks that passively try to
eavesdrop (T11) configuration data are efficiently mitigated
by the implemented security measures (C3) and the security
features of NFC (C4).
B. Overhead
The overhead resulting from the implemented security mea-
sures can be split into a static and into a variable part.
The static overhead, resulting from the information added
to the encrypted configuration data and MAC, can easily be
calculated by summing up all fields with specified sizes in
Fig. 3. The resulting static overhead is Ostatic = 16 bytes.
The variable overhead depends on the chosen cryptographic
algorithms. For this evaluation, HMAC-SHA256 is assumed
as hashing algorithm which adds an additional overhead of
Ovariable = 32 bytes. The resulting total overhead in that case
would be O = Ostatic + Ovariable = 48 bytes. An overview
of the overhead relative to the configuration data size up to
4 kB of data is shown in Fig. 6. As can be seen there, when
transferring configuration data of about 300 bytes, less than
15% of the transferred data will be security imposed overhead.
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Fig. 6. Overhead in percent relative to transferred configuration data.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we present an NFC- and QR-code based hybrid
configuration approach for smart sensors which is suitable
for smart factory and smart home use cases. To provide
the necessary functionality for sensors, an NFC enhancement
module is presented. To mitigate potential security challenges
imposed by such an additional configuration interface, ap-
propriate security measures are included in our approach. It
is also shown that by including those security measures, an
acceptable amount of overhead is imposed. The feasibility
of our approach is demonstrated as a prototype which is
presented in this work. As future work we plan to include
a password based key exchange protocol such as SPAKE
[29] to require user authentication when applying updates.
Authenticated users could then read configuration parameters
from a smart sensor, directly modify them on their mobile
device and update the smart sensor’s configuration.
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